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In 1972, in Sierra Club v. Morton,1 the United States Supreme
Court rejected the Sierra Club’s attempt to assert Article III standing
under the Administrative Procedure Act based on its own corporate
interest in environmental issues.  The Court suggested instead that an
environmental organization must rely on its ability to represent the
environmental interests of its individual members.  Since Morton, no
environmental organization has been successful in asserting its own
corporate interest in environmental resources as the basis for Article
III standing in environmental litigation.  For the most part, public in-
terest environmental organizations have given up trying to assert di-
rect environmental interests, relying instead on organizational stand-
ing as representatives of their affected members.  Courts have
routinely inquired into the individual standing interests asserted by
organizational plaintiffs.2  But, in recent years, this representational
standing hurdle has become harder and harder to clear, as courts have
demanded ever more detailed showings of individual injury and cau-
sation.
Entities asserting direct business interests have fared far better in
the courts.  Most recently, in Bennett v. Spear,3 the Supreme Court
upheld the statutory and constitutional standing of ranchers to chal-
lenge a habitat conservation plan adopted under the Endangered
Species Act.4  Courts have likewise recognized standing under the en-
vironmental laws for business corporations asserting economic inter-
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; Co-Director, Pace Envi-
ronmental Litigation Clinic, Inc.; B.A., Middlebury College, 1980; J.D., Columbia University,
1984.
1. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
2. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149 (4th
Cir. 2000).
3. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
4. See id. at 172-74.
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ests.5  These courts have not conducted any inquiry into the individual
interest of corporate shareholders; the corporate entities’ business in-
terests were found to be sufficient.6
This article suggests that, as an antidote to the ever-tightening
restrictions on individual environmental standing, a state may charter
a not-for-profit corporation organized to protect a particular envi-
ronmental resource, giving the corporation a non-exclusive portion of
the State’s interest in enforcing applicable environmental protections.
The dichotomy between not-for-profit organizations that may litigate
only as the representative of individual members’ interests, and busi-
ness corporations that assert their own direct economic interests, may
seem natural to our late-twentieth-century sensibility, but is not
founded in original intent.  The framers of Article III, which grants
jurisdiction over “cases and controversies” to the federal courts,
would have seen the latter day business corporation as something of
an oddity.  Most incorporated entities during the eighteenth century
were religious institutions, municipalities, and government franchi-
sees.  In fact, the now ubiquitous business corporation did not be-
come commonplace until the early nineteenth century, as government
franchise corporations expanded to include incorporation of private
businesses.7  To the framers, then, the concept of a corporate entity
asserting community interests in natural resources on its own behalf
would have been no more alien than the concept of a corporate entity
asserting private business interests.
A line of cases suggests that states and municipalities have
standing to assert environmental interests within their jurisdiction
without reference to individual standing or injury on the part of any
particular resident.8  And, state-chartered corporations have long
been delegated functions and powers originally residing in state gov-
ernment.9 It follows that a state-chartered organization should have
Article III standing to assert its own interest in protecting environ-
mental resources directly, without reference to the individual inter-
ests of its members.
5. See Pacific Northwest Generating Coop. v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 1994)
(finding standing for aluminum and hydropower industries under the Endangered Species Act).
6. See id. at 1066.
7. See RONALD SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION,
1784-1855: BROADENING THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC SERVICE DURING INDUSTRIALIZATION
(1982).
8. See infra Part IV.A.
9. See infra Part IV.B.
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I.  THE ROAD NOT TAKEN:  A DETOUR FROM
DIRECT ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING AFTER
SIERRA CLUB V. MORTON
The litigation choices made by the Sierra Club in Sierra Club v.
Morton, the first environmental standing case to reach the Supreme
Court, established the path for all environmental citizen plaintiffs.  By
choosing to rely on its general interest in environmental issues na-
tionally, rather than its particular corporate interest in the Sierra Ne-
vada mountains, Sierra Club provoked a Supreme Court precedent
that all but rejected the assertion of a non-profit corporation’s direct
environmental interests.10  With the Court’s Morton decision blocking
the direct road to environmental standing for organizations, these
plaintiffs took the convenient detour through representational
standing.  In 1977, the Supreme Court established an easily met test
for representational standing that, in part, relied on the individual
standing of the organization’s members.11  Indirect standing based on
the interests of members rather than corporate interest proved expe-
dient for the following two decades of environmental litigation.
More recently, however, representational standing has proven
more and more difficult to establish.  The federal courts, following
the United States Supreme Court’s lead in its 1992 decision in Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife,12 have made it more difficult to show individ-
ual members’ standing by imposing ever stricter requirements for es-
tablishing the Article III requirement of “injury in fact.” Some courts
have been receptive to attacks on environmental organization’s rep-
resentative capacity as well, inquiring closely into the relationship be-
tween the organizational plaintiff and its members with standing.
These restrictions on standing threaten to defeat Congress’ plan of
citizen environmental enforcement as a backstop to government en-
forcement of federal environmental laws.13
A. Morton and the Rejection of Standing Based on Abstract
Environmental Issues
In 1965, the United States Forest Service invited bids from pri-
vate developers for the development of a ski resort in the Mineral
King area of the Sequoia National Forest, an undeveloped wilderness.
10. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
11. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
12. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
13. See S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 35-37 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5356.
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Walt Disney Enterprises, Inc. responded with a proposal to build a
complex of ski trails and lifts, motels, restaurants, pools, and a cog
railway, all designed to accommodate 14,000 visitors a day.  The For-
est Service gave Disney preliminary approval and permits to survey
the area in preparation for a master development plan.14
The Sierra Club was, as it is today, a national environmental or-
ganization.  Founded in 1892, its mission is to “to explore, enjoy, and
protect the wild places of the Earth.”15  Sierra Club was an active op-
ponent of the Mineral King development.  When the Forest Service
gave its approval to the Disney development bid, Sierra Club chal-
lenged the approval in federal district court.  In these pre-NEPA16
days, Sierra Club challenged the authority of the Forest Service to
grant leases and approvals under various provisions of the statutes
governing use of the national forests.  Sierra Club supported its
standing to sue with allegations based primarily on its status as a na-
tional environmental organization.  Its complaint asserted:
For many years the Sierra Club by its activities and conduct has ex-
hibited a special interest in the conservation and sound mainte-
nance of the national parks, game refuges and forests of the coun-
try, regularly serving as a responsible representative of persons
similarly interested.  One of the principal purposes of the Sierra
Club is to protect and conserve the national resources of the Sierra
Nevada Mountains.17
The District Court found these standing allegations sufficient,
and found sufficient doubt in the legality of the Forest Service’s ap-
provals to grant a preliminary injunction against further permits and
approvals pending the litigation.  However, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, noting that there was “no allegation in the com-
plaint that members of the Sierra Club would be affected by the ac-
tions of  [the Forest Service] other than the fact that the actions are
personally displeasing or distasteful to them.”18
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s
dismissal in its seminal decision on environmental standing.  Justice
Stewart’s opinion for the majority cleared the path for environmental
standing generally, by recognizing non-economic interests as a suffi-
cient basis for Article III “injury in fact:”
14. See Morton, 405 U.S. at 729.
15. Sierra Club, Sierra Club Policies (visited Oct. 18, 2000),
<http://www.sierraclub.org/policy/>.
16. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1994).
17. Morton, 405 U.S. at 735 n.8.
18. See Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 33 (9th Cir. 1970).
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Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being,
are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and
the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the
many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of le-
gal protection through the judicial process.19
The majority nonetheless blocked Sierra Club’s claim of standing
based solely on the organization’s general interest in environmental
issues.  While recognizing that the Mineral King development would
wreak environmental injury on someone, according to the Court, Si-
erra Club had not shown that it was itself “among the injured.”20  The
Court noted Sierra Club’s specific refusal to rely on the possible indi-
vidual interests of its members for the purposes of the appeal.21  The
Court rejected decisions in some circuit courts recognizing standing of
non-profit organizations to assert the public interest.22  Instead, the
Court established as the constitutional minimum under Article III a
requirement of “individual” injury.  The majority assumed that, at
least for the Sierra Club, the font of that individual injury must be the
interests of its members, and not its own corporate interests.
Justice Douglas’s dissent in Morton is at least as memorable as
the majority opinion, for its suggestion that environmental resources
themselves—the very rocks, trees, rivers, and forests—should have
standing to sue in their own name in federal court, much as ships have
standing to sue as libellants in admiralty.23  Justice Douglas even drew
the analogy to historical corporate entities, such as the ecclesiastical
“corporation sole,” that were given a fictional legal personality to
permit suit in the courts.24  Nevertheless, Justice Douglas was not that
far removed from the majority about the question of who should have
standing to speak for the forests and rivers in court; he also would
rely on the use of the environmental resources by individual members
of an organizational plaintiff.  Using the river as the paradigmatic en-
vironmental resource, he wrote: “Those people who have a meaning-
ful relationship to that body of water—whether it be a fisherman, a
canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger—must be able to speak for the val-
19. Morton, 405 U.S. at 734.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 735.
22. See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965) (finding that environmental groups had standing to assert their special inter-
ests under the Federal Power Act).
23. See Morton, 405 U.S. at 741-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
24. See id. at 742 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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ues which the river represents and which are threatened with destruc-
tion.”25  Noting the Sierra Club’s allegation that its principal purpose
was to “protect and conserve the national resources of the Sierra Ne-
vada Mountains,” Justice Douglas seems to have presumed that this
meaningful relationship test was satisfied, and would have found
standing.26
There is common ground between the majority and dissent in
Morton.  The majority recognized that environmental and aesthetic
interests satisfied the “injury in fact” requirements of Article III
standing, but would require specific allegations that members of a
plaintiff organization personally and individually suffered such inju-
ries.  Justice Douglas likewise recognized that environmental interests
constituted “injury in fact,” but was willing to go one step further to
recognize the standing of the environmental resources themselves.
However, Justice Douglas, like the majority, assumed the need for
some natural person27 with a meaningful relationship to the environ-
mental resource, to serve as its spokesperson.  There is unspoken
agreement between the majority and the dissent that corporate per-
sons do not suffer direct environmental injury, but serve only as liti-
gating conduits for the environmental interests of their members.
The Morton Court thus assumed, without deciding, that incorpo-
rated environmental organizations would not have any corporate en-
vironmental interests to assert directly.  It is easy to posit a situation
where a not-for-profit might irrefutably have such interests, as when
it owns real property that has been directly affected by environmental
pollution.  But such a case begs the question, as the environmental
injury in such a case is also an economic injury.28  A property dam-
aged by environmental pollution is worth less money.  The unspoken
assumption of Morton and other cases is that, for Article III injury,
corporate interests (even of the not-for-profit variety) amount to
economic interests only.  As we will see, this is not borne out by the
history of corporations, either in this country or in England.  Never-
theless, since Morton, the Supreme Court has not had to address the
possibility of direct environmental injury claimed by an environ-
mental non-profit organization.  The question simply has not arisen
25. Id. at 743 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
26. See id. at 744 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
27. I am using “natural person” here in the sense of a non-corporate person.
28. Cf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 365 (1982) (finding that a drain on
organizational resources, but not an interference with organizational mission, supports stand-
ing).
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because, for the most part, environmental organizations have found it
more expedient to follow the Court’s cue, and to rely on the envi-
ronmental interests of their members.
B. The Detour Through Representational Standing and the
Representational Standing Test
Since the Morton decision, most organizational environmental
plaintiffs have relied on the individual standing of their members, and
the representative capacity of the organization, to establish standing
to sue.  Thus, in the next environmental standing case to reach the
Supreme Court, United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP),29 the organizational plaintiff relied on
the alleged injuries flowing from increased rail freight rates to its
members who used forests in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area
for “camping, hiking, fishing, sightseeing, and other recreational pur-
poses.”30  At the pleading stage, the Supreme Court affirmed a deci-
sion approving the standing of SCRAP.
Following the Morton and SCRAP decisions, there are precious
few reported decisions in which environmental organizations sought
to rely on their own interests to support standing, and none where
they were successful.  In one of these few cases, Sierra Club v. SCM
Corp.,31 the Sierra Club again sought to assert standing based on its
own organizational interest in environmental issues.  The Sierra Club
argued that the citizen-suit provision of the Clean Water Act32 ex-
panded the standing available to organizational plaintiffs.  The Sec-
ond Circuit made short work of this argument, relying on Morton to
reject the Sierra Club’s persistent claim that its interest and expertise
in environmental issues established its standing apart from the recrea-
tional or environmental interests of its members.33
More recently, the federal District Court for the Central District
of Illinois rejected an attempt to prosecute a site clean-up action un-
der the imminent and substantial endangerment provision of the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)34 brought by Citi-
29. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
30. See id. at 678.
31. 747 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984).
32. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994).
33. See SCM Corp., 747 F.2d at 102.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1994).
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zens for a Better Environment (CBE) “on its own behalf.”35  Like Si-
erra Club, CBE relied on its organizational interest in preserving en-
vironmental values, and, also like Sierra Club, was unsuccessful.  Ac-
cording to the court: “CBE has not offered any evidence, or even
addressed in any of its various memoranda, how it, as an organization,
has suffered anything more than a mere setback to its abstract social
interests.  Therefore, CBE cannot sue on its own behalf.”36
In cases where organizations have sought to rely on both their
own organizational interests and the individual interests of their
members, they have been successful only in the latter.37  Most organ-
izational plaintiffs rely simply and exclusively on the individual
standing of their members.
For the most part, this detour into representational standing
proved a smooth ride for the environmental organizations.  The Su-
preme Court established a three-part test for representational stand-
ing in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission:38
Thus we have recognized that an association has standing to bring
suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would other-
wise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c)
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the par-
ticipation of individual members in the lawsuit.39
The second and third of these requirements never posed any problem
for organizational environmental plaintiffs.  The environmental inter-
ests they sought to litigate were uniformly “germane” to the purposes
of the organization, and the kinds of suits they brought, typically
seeking injunctive relief or penalties, but not individual damages, did
not require individual participation by their members.
35. See Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Caterpillar, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1060 (C.D. Ill.
1998).
36. Id. at 1061.  Several courts have also rejected claims of direct “informational injury” as
a basis of standing by environmental organizations.  See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown
Cent. Petroleum Corp., 95 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting standing for FOE in Clean Water
Act citizen suit); Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (reject-
ing informational claim under the environmental impact statement requirement of the National
Environmental Policy Act).  These decisions are highly questionable in light of the Supreme
Court’s decision last term in Akins v. Federal Election Commission, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), which
held that where Congress created a right to information, any person claiming a desire to have
such information has standing to litigate.
37. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440, 446
(D. Md. 1985).
38. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
39. Id. at 343.
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Nor did the showing that individual members of the organization
would have standing in their own right pose any significant obstacle
to organizational standing in the first two decades of environmental
litigation after Morton.  Courts were routinely satisfied by allegations
or affidavits establishing recreational use of the affected environ-
mental resource by members of the organizational plaintiff.  Thus, the
Second Circuit found sufficient for standing allegations that one
member regularly passed the Hudson River and “finds the pollution
in the river offensive to [his] aesthetic values” and that another mem-
ber’s “children swim in the river, . . . occasionally fish[] in the river
and his family has and will continue to picnic along the river.”40
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit found sufficient allegations that one of
the plaintiff’s members regularly hiked along the river into which the
defendant’s industrial discharges flowed.41
For example, in a Clean Water Act citizens’ enforcement suit
brought by the Chesapeake Bay Foundation (CBF), the Maryland
District Court found:
The three members of CBF who have submitted affidavits have in-
dicated that they use and enjoy the Patapsco River and other areas
of the Chesapeake Bay water system.  CBF itself is a regional envi-
ronmental organization with many members who are residents of
Maryland.  Undoubtedly, many more than the three named indi-
viduals use and enjoy the Chesapeake Bay, but CBF has chosen to
name only three in support of its claim to representational standing.
There is no question that those three members have shown suffi-
cient injury in fact to show standing in this action.  Therefore, CBF
may proceed in this action as representative of those members.42
Given the hostility of courts after Morton to recognize environ-
mental organizations’ standing to represent their own interests, and
the relative receptivity of the court to claims of individual standing by
these organizations’ members, it is hardly surprising that organiza-
tional environmental plaintiffs grew to rely exclusively on representa-
tional standing.  Most of the larger national and regional organiza-
tions needed only to search their membership lists to find members
who recreated along or near the environmental resource in question,
and get that member to agree to submit an affidavit for standing pur-
poses.  The member’s participation posed little burden.  With such a
low threshold to establish individual environmental injury, the nature
40. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1985).
41. See Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., 847 F.2d 1109, 1112 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1988).
42. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. at 445.
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of the member’s interest was rarely an issue for intensive discovery or
trial.
As the law of environmental standing matured, however, the
threshold for individual standing and the burden on the organization
and its members to establish representational standing began to in-
crease.
C. Ruts and Potholes on the Representational Standing Detour
During the 1980s, several major environmental organizations
embarked on systematic programs to enforce Clean Water Act per-
mits pursuant to the Clean Water Act citizen-suit provisions.  The
litigation that ensued produced many decisions that refined the re-
quirements for the representational standing test.  By the end of the
decade, faced with increasingly sophisticated challenges to plaintiffs’
standing in these enforcement initiatives, the courts began to tighten
the standards for establishing both individual and representational
standing.  Courts began to inquire into the organizational relationship
between the plaintiff organization and its members.43  At the same
time, instead of simply requiring a showing of recreational use of the
environmental resource in question, courts began to require a show-
ing of specific, observable impacts to the resource.44
1. Judicial Inquiry into Organizational Structure
Environmental plaintiffs’ reliance on representational standing
invited judicial inquiry into their organizational structure and repre-
sentative capacity.  Organizational plaintiffs were faced with discov-
ery demands for affected members.45  While the Supreme Court had
previously held membership lists to be protected by the First
Amendment,46 and organizations were interested in protecting the
privacy of their members, defendants were nonetheless entitled to
discover before trial which members an organizational plaintiff in-
tended to rely on to establish standing.47  At least one court resolved
the issue by accepting affidavits from affected members under seal.48
43. See infra Part I.C.1.
44. See infra Part I.C.2.
45. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 580 F. Supp. 862, 865 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 747
F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1984).
46. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958).
47. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3).
48. See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440, 446 (D.
Md. 1985) (finding that NRDC did have representational standing even though it chose not to
publicly release the names of all its affected members).
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More fundamentally, courts began inquiring into the exact cor-
porate structure of these organizational plaintiffs.  Following deci-
sions in other contexts, some commentators suggested that an organi-
zation may sue on behalf of its members only if it can establish that
the putative members had some form of control over the activities of
the organization.49  The Ninth Circuit followed this reasoning and re-
jected a claim of organizational standing in an environmental case
where the corporate plaintiff was organized as a non-membership
corporation, with no voting members.50  The Northern District of New
York, on the other hand, rejected a challenge to Sierra Club’s organ-
izational capacity to represent impacted members even though those
members constituted a very small minority of its national member-
ship, reasoning that the requisite control of the organization need not
be actual majority control so long as the represented members had
some voice in the organization’s governance.51
These authorities invited factual and legal inquiry into the exact
structure of corporate governance of environmental plaintiff organi-
zations.  In one case, a district court conducted a three-day trial in-
quiring into the organizational structure of plaintiff Friends of the
Earth (FOE), and concluded that FOE’s failure to adopt formal crite-
ria for membership qualification precluded its acting in a representa-
tive capacity on behalf of its putative members.52  The Fifth Circuit
reversed, finding sufficient indicia of membership to support repre-
sentational standing under Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertis-
ing Commission.53  Other courts have similarly found sufficient repre-
sentational capacity based on a finding of de facto membership
control of the organization.54  Recent commentary suggests that an
49. See, e.g., JEFFREY G. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL
POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 21 (1987); MICHAEL D. AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN
SUITS § 6.07(C) at 6-32 (1995) (citing Health Research Group v. Kennedy, 82 F.R.D. 21 (D.D.C.
1979)).
50. See Pacific Legal Found., Inc. v. Gorsuch, 18 ERC (BNA) 1127 (9th Cir. 1982).
51. See Sierra Club v. Aluminum Corp. of Am., 585 F. Supp. 842 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
52. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. Co., 919 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Tex.
1996), rev’d, 129 F.3d 826 (5th Cir. 1997).
53. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
54. See Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d
111 (3d Cir. 1997); Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 986 F.
Supp. 1406, 1409 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (finding “de facto membership organization”).
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inquiry into the corporate governance of plaintiff organizations
should remain an essential element of representational standing.55
These inquiries into the membership lists and corporate govern-
ance are at a minimum burdensome, and at worst, fatal to the organi-
zation’s standing.  Yet, often these organizational standing burdens
pale in comparison to the ever-elevating hurdle to establish standing
for individual members in the first place.
2. The Rising Bar of Individual Injury in Fact
As noted, the early decisions in environmental enforcement suits
established a relatively light burden for showing individual member
standing.  An affidavit stating that members of the organization used
the affected resource usually sufficed.56  However, courts have begun
requiring increasingly specific showings of objective environmental
harm.  As a result, reliance on members’ claims of individual injury
has become increasingly tenuous.
The first hint of increasing judicial scrutiny into members’ claims
of individual injury came in a Third Circuit case, Public Interest Re-
search Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell-Duffryn Terminals, Inc.57
In Powell-Duffryn, the Public Interest Research Group (PIRG)
brought a citizen suit to enforce Clean Water Act permit require-
ments against an industrial discharger.  PIRG’s complaint alleged
generally that it had members who resided and/or recreated on or
near the Kill Van Kull, the affected water body.  When the defendant
moved to dismiss for lack of standing, PIRG amplified these allega-
tions with more specific affidavits, including affidavits of members
who hiked, jogged, or birdwatched along the Kill Van Kull and spe-
cifically complained about the brown color, foul odor, and oily sheens
in the water.58  The Third Circuit upheld the District Court’s grant of
summary judgment in PIRG’s favor on standing and liability.  In do-
ing so, however, it specifically rejected the claim that any water pollu-
tion in violation of the Clean Water Act constituted an injury in fact
to recreational users of the water body, and instead required the
plaintiff to establish specific, objective injuries suffered by its mem-
bers as a result of water pollution.  The aesthetic injuries averred in
55. See generally Charles H. Steen & Michael B. Hopkins, Corporate Governance Meets the
Constitution: A Case Study of Nonprofit Membership Corporations and Their Associational
Standing Under Article III, 17 REV. LITIG. 209 (1998).
56. See MILLER, supra note 49, at 21-22.
57. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990).
58. See id. at 71.
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the plaintiffs’ affidavits—foul odors, brown color, and oily sheens—
were held to be sufficient.59
The Third Circuit went on to establish a practical approach to
the “causation” prong of the Article III standing test.  This approach
is to consider whether the specific pollutants complained of are gen-
erally capable of causing the alleged harms, without requiring proof
that the specific pollution coming out of the defendant’s pipe was the
sole cause of the harm.60  Although this decision was a short-term vic-
tory for environmental plaintiffs, as it upheld PIRG’s standing and es-
tablished a workable test for causation, the Powell-Duffryn decision
also had the effect of raising the bar for individual environmental
standing.  No longer would a simple allegation that a plaintiff’s mem-
bers recreated on or near the affected resource suffice to establish
injury.  Now plaintiffs would be required to establish specific observ-
able impacts of pollution before they could sue.  The Powell-Duffryn
standard was swiftly adopted by other federal courts.61
In the early 1990s, two Supreme Court decisions led the way to
further restrictions on environmental representational standing.  In
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,62 the Court rejected statutory
standing on the part of an organization whose members claimed to
use Forest Service lands in the vicinity of a vast area of federal lands
opened up for mineral development.  Here standing was rejected be-
cause the plaintiff failed to establish that its members recreated on
any of the lands actually opened for development.63  In Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife (Lujan),64 the Court rejected Article III standing in
a case brought under the Endangered Species Act, even though the
plaintiff’s members had professional or avocational interests in par-
ticular endangered species that might be impacted by United States
funding of certain development projects abroad.  In Lujan, the basis
for rejection was that individual members could not identify any spe-
cific plans to visit the affected venues in the future.65
59. See id.
60. See id. at 73.
61. See, e.g., Save Our Community v. EPA, 971 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1992); Natural Re-
sources Defense Council v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1992); Concerned Area Residents
for the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 834 F. Supp. 1410 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 34
F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1994).
62. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
63. See id. at 889.
64. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
65. See id. at 564.
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Neither of these cases represented a dramatic departure from
previous environmental standing doctrine on their facts; after all, the
Sierra Club v. Morton decision had long ago required that environ-
mental plaintiffs demonstrate that they themselves be “among the
injured.”66  Individuals who cannot establish any physical proximity to
threatened environmental resources, not surprisingly, are not “among
the injured.”  Nevertheless, the tone of Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in Lujan sent shock waves through the environmental plain-
tiffs’ community and led many commentators to question the contin-
ued viability of the federal environmental citizen suit.67  In his rejec-
tion of standing based on the theory of the entire world as one inter-
linked ecosystem, Justice Scalia wrote that the Endangered Species
Act could not create rights “in persons who have not been injured in
fact, that is, persons who use portions of an ecosystem not perceptibly
affected by the unlawful action in question.”68
It is this language requiring “perceptible” injury that has led
many lower federal courts to dramatically tighten previously liberal
standards for establishing environmental “injury in fact.”  A case in
the Third Circuit that bracketed the Lujan  decision presents the most
dramatic example of this change in judicial winds.  PIRG brought a
Clean Water Act permit enforcement suit against a chemical manu-
66. See 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972).
67. See generally Charles A. Abell, Ignoring the Trees for the Forest: How the Citizens Suit
Provision of the Clean Water Act Violates the Constitution’s Separation of Powers Principle, 81
VA. L. REV. 1957 (1995); Harold Feld, Saving the Citizen Suit: The Effect of Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife and the Role of Citizen Suits in Environmental Enforcement, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
141 (1994); Robert B. June, Citizen Suits: The Structure of Standing Requirements for Citizen
Suits and the Scope of Congressional Power, 24 ENVTL. L. 761 (1994); Harold J. Krent & Ethan
G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1793 (1993); Cass R.
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?  Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH L.
REV. 163 (1992); Robert Wiygul, Gwaltney Eight Years Later: Proving Jurisdiction and Article
III Standing in Clean Water Act Citizen Suits, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 435 (1995); Matthew M.
Werner, Note, Mootness and the Citizen Suit Civil Penalty Claims Under the Clean Water Act: A
Post-Lujan Reassessment, 25 ENVTL. L. 801 (1995); Christopher T. Burt, Comment, Procedural
Injury Standing after Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 275 (1995).  For an
analysis of the assertion that standing based solely on use of the affected resource remains vi-
able after Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, see Karl S. Coplan, Refracting the Spectrum of Clean
Water Act Standing in Light of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 169
(1997).
68. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 566.  Justice Scalia’s emphasis on “perceptible” injury is tem-
pered somewhat by Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion (joined by Justice Souter), which spe-
cifically recognized the power of Congress “to define injuries and articulate chains of causation
that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.”  Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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facturing facility, Magnesium Elektron, Inc. (MEI).69  Early in the liti-
gation, PIRG sought a declaratory judgment to establish that it had
standing and that MEI had violated its water permit.70  It supported
this motion with affidavits from its members, which established that
they made recreational use of waters downstream of MEI’s discharge,
including the Delaware River, and that their enjoyment of these wa-
ters was diminished by the knowledge that the River contained pol-
lutants.  The District Court granted PIRG’s motion in an opinion is-
sued before Lujan, declaring that it had standing on the basis of these
affidavits.71  The Third Circuit granted an interlocutory appeal and af-
firmed without opinion.72  The case proceeded to trial on the issue of
appropriate penalties, the issues of standing and liability having al-
ready been determined.
At trial, PIRG sought penalties under the Clean Water Act
based on the money saved by non-compliance and the defendants’
lack of efforts to comply.73  MEI defended by presenting expert testi-
mony that the quantities of the pollutants in question (primarily total
organic carbon and chlorides) would not cause any perceptible impact
either on the creek into which they were discharged or downstream in
the Delaware River.  Believing the issue of standing to have been set-
tled in its favor, PIRG did not present new scientific testimony in re-
buttal.74  The District Court awarded penalties and attorneys fees.
MEI appealed to the Third Circuit.
The Third Circuit vacated the judgment and directed a dismissal
of the complaint for lack of a justiciable controversy.75  Relying on
Lujan, the Court ruled that the unopposed scientific testimony of lack
of perceptible harm to the receiving waters precluded the existence of
a “case or controversy.”76  Despite its earlier affirmation of the plain-
tiff’s standing, the court reasoned that the “law of the case” doctrine
could not preclude the reopening of jurisdictional issues such as
69. See Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 34 ERC
(BNA) 2077 (D.N.J. 1992), aff’d, 983 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1992).
70. See id. at 2079-80.
71. See id. at 2080-81.
72. See 983 F.2d 1052.
73. See Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 40 ERC
(BNA) 1917 (D.N.J. 1995) (relying on the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1994)).
74. See id.
75. See Public Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d
111 (3d Cir. 1997).
76. See id. at 121.
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standing.77  The court refused even to remand the case to allow the
plaintiff to present further evidence of actual harm to the receiving
water body.78
Other post-Lujan cases have similarly raised the bar required to
establish individual injury in fact.  The Fourth Circuit recently re-
jected claims of standing in a Clean Water Act enforcement case
against a copper smelter even though the plaintiffs included both a
canoe guide who depended on clean water downstream of the plant
to run his guiding business, and the owner of a lake located down-
stream of the plant who limited swimming and fish consumption be-
cause of his concerns about pollution.79  The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that, although the copper smelter admitted to discharges of copper
and other heavy metals in excess of its permit limits, the plaintiffs had
not established that metals concentrations in the river and lake were
higher than levels found elsewhere.80
Compared to the affidavits found sufficient in early Clean Water
Act citizens enforcement cases, the burdens imposed by the Third
Circuit in Magnesium Elektron and the Fourth Circuit in Gaston
Copper are nearly insurmountable.  Under these cases, the threshold
question of environmental standing would require detailed (and ex-
pensive) scientific analysis of ambient water quality, “natural” condi-
tions, and the relationship between pollutant discharges and “percep-
tible” impacts on water quality.  Commentators and the media have
noted this most recent judicial trend making citizen enforcement
more difficult.81
3.  Laidlaw:  The Detour Takes Another Turn
Most recently, the United States Supreme Court seems to have
halted the trend away from representational standing with its decision
in Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.82  In
Laidlaw, the Court emphasized that the touchstone of environmental
standing is not injury to the environmental resource, but injury to the
77. See id. at 117.
78. See id. at 126 (Lewis, J., dissenting because PIRG was not on notice that standing re-
mained an issue).
79. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Co., 179 F.3d 107 (4th Cir.
1999), rev’d en banc, 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000).
80. See id. at 113-14.
81. See William Glaberson, Novel Antipollution Tool is Being Upset by Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 1999, at A1; John D. Echeverria & Jon T. Zeidler, Barely Standing: The Erosion
of Citizen “Standing” to Sue and Enforce Environmental Law at 1 (Envtl. Policy Project,
Georgetown University Law Ctr., June 1999).
82. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
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individual plaintiff.  This individual injury may be established by
showing a reasonable concern for the effects of environmental pollu-
tion, without showing a demonstrable injury to the resource itself.83  It
remains to be seen how the lower federal courts will implement the
Supreme Court’s approach to injury in fact in Laidlaw.84  At a mini-
mum, the Gaston Copper and Magnesium Elektron decisions seem
unsupportable in light of Laidlaw.
If Laidlaw does not effect a shift in the courts’ recent interpreta-
tion of “injury in fact,” increased judicial scrutiny into organizational
structure, and the rising bar for individual standing may merit recon-
sideration of reliance on an organization’s representational standing.
Regardless, the untested question remains: how can a corporate en-
tity establish an environmental interest in a resource that is somehow
greater, and more cognizable for Article III purposes, than the sum of
the individual interests of its members?
Unlike environmental not-for-profit groups, business corpora-
tions have not suffered from the handicap of having to establish the
individual standing of their shareholders, or their capacity to repre-
sent these shareholders.  While environmental not-for-profit corpora-
tions have struggled to identify individual members who can satisfy
the ever-increasing threshold for individual standing, businesses
seeking to litigate environmental issues have enjoyed ever-easier ac-
cess to the courts.
II.  BUSINESS INTERESTS ON THE STANDING SUPERHIGHWAY
At the same time as the bars to individual standing have been in-
creasing, Courts have been increasingly receptive to standing for
business corporations, usually brought to challenge environmentally
protective measures rather than to enforce them.  While one early
commentator suggested that “[r]egardless of how the issue of injury is
resolved, for profit corporations have difficulty with standing because
of the zone of interest test,”85 this did not prove to be the case.  The
83. See id. at 181.
84. This article was conceived and largely written prior to the announcement of the Laid-
law decision.  Obviously, if the Court’s new approach to injury in fact is applied by the lower
federal courts, many of the recent impediments to environmental organizations’ standing will be
removed.  Nevertheless, the question of organizational capacity, as well as the difficulties of lo-
cating individual members willing to expose themselves to the rigors of litigation will continue
to hamper organizations seeking to assert environmental interests.
85. See MILLER, supra note 49, at 24.  Under the “zone of interests” test, courts would not
recognize a plaintiffs’ standing unless the interests they sought to assert were within the “zone
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Supreme Court recently decided, in Bennett v. Spear,86 that the “zone
of interests” test does not apply to most of the citizens enforcement
provisions of the federal environmental laws.87  The resulting doctrine
puts businesses asserting rights to exploit natural resources at a dis-
tinct advantage in the courts over individuals who seek to protect
such resources.
Although a few decisions have revealed doubt about the standing
of business corporations to assert rights under the environmental
statutes,88 the distinct trend has been towards recognizing economic
injury as a basis for standing to litigate environmental issues.  Thus,
courts have allowed potential contractors and housing developers to
enforce Clean Water Act permit provisions requiring sewage treat-
ment plant upgrades.89  Another court recognized the right of an elec-
tric utility to bring a Clean Air Act citizen suit challenging a potential
co-generation facility that would eat into its rate base.90  In a more re-
cent case, the Ninth Circuit recognized the right of electrical utilities
to enforce the consultation requirement of the Endangered Species
Act,91 even though their only interest in the endangered salmon in-
volved was to avoid further flow requirements that would affect their
hydroelectric power costs.92
The culmination of this trend towards liberalized business
standing to assert environmental claims was the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Bennett v. Spear.  The prior cases had recognized standing on
the part of businesses whose economic interests happened to coincide
with enforcement of the environmental protections at issue.  In
Bennett, the Court recognized business interests’ standing to enforce
the procedural provisions of environmental statutes even where those
of interests” protected by the underlying statute.  See Valley Forge Christian College v. Ameri-
cans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 465, 474-475 (1982).
86.  520 U.S. 154 (1997).
87. See id. at 162.
88. See Citizens Coordinating Comm. on Friendship Heights, Inc. v. Washington Metro.
Area Transit Auth., 765 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (rejecting claim of environmental injury by a
business corporation); Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1979).
89. See Locust Lane v. Swatara Township Auth., 636 F. Supp. 534 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (holding
that developers precluded from building on their property due to failure of a pollution control
plant to comply with a permit had standing to sue under the Clean Water Act); Michigan v. City
of Allen Park, 501 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (finding contractors had standing to bring
suit against city under the Clean Water Act).
90. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Realty Invs. Assocs., 524 F. Supp. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(denying award of attorney’s fees and recognizing claim under the Clean Air Act was not frivo-
lous).
91. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
92. See Pacific Northwest Generating Coop. v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1994).
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interests were directly contrary to the environmental values the stat-
utes sought to protect.  The Bennett plaintiffs consisted of ranchers
and irrigation districts that protested a biological opinion given by the
National Marine Fisheries Service under section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act.93  The opinion required minimum reservoir levels as a
means of protecting endangered fish, the Lost River sucker and the
shortnose sucker, in certain reservoirs.94  The ranchers claimed that
this biological opinion, the effect of which would be to deprive them
of water they wished to use in their ranching businesses, violated sec-
tion 7 of the Endangered Species Act in that it constituted a de facto
critical habitat designation without the consideration of economic im-
pacts required by section 4(b)(2) of the Act.95
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court quickly disposed of any
“zone of interests” objection to the ranchers’ standing to assert their
competing claim to the water needed by shortnose and Lost River
suckers under the Endangered Species Act.  The Court reasoned that
the “zone of interest” test was a prudential limitation on standing, not
grounded in the Constitutional “case or controversy” requirement,
and that Congress intentionally abrogated the “zone of interests” test
by authorizing a suit to enforce the Endangered Species Act by “any
person.”96  The Court barely paused to find that the rancher plaintiffs
satisfied the “injury in fact” requirement of Article III of the Consti-
tution, holding an allegation that the effect of the biological opinion
would be to reduce the water available for their ranching business to
be sufficient.97
While perhaps not surprising as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion and constitutional standing doctrine, the impact of the Bennett
decision is jarring.  Bennett flings open the courthouse doors to busi-
ness interests seeking to exploit the environmental resources needed
by endangered species to survive shortly after the same Court effec-
tively slammed the doors on those seeking to assert the interests of
the endangered species themselves, in Lujan.98  It will always be easier
for businesses to establish their economic interests in exploitation of
93. See 520 U.S. at 159.
94. See id.
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994).
96. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 165-66 (citing ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)) (distinguishing citi-
zen-suit provisions such as the provision in the Clean Water Act, which limits the citizens
authorized to sue to those “having an interest which is or may be adversely affected.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365 (g)).
97. See id. at 167-168.
98. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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environmental resources than for individuals to establish the “percep-
tible,” “individualized” injury in fact resulting from a reduction in
species abundance or an incremental loss of environmental resources.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the relative ease with
which business interests may assert standing in environmental cases is
a Clean Air Act case decided a few years ago in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania.  In Ogden Projects, Inc. v. New Morgan Landfill
Co.,99 individuals as well as the corporate owner of a competing land-
fill challenged the development of a new landfill without obtaining an
air quality new source permit that would require offsetting emissions
reductions, including reductions of ozone precursors.  The individual
plaintiffs alleged that they lived and recreated in the region whose air
quality was affected by emissions from the landfill.  This air quality
region was in non-attainment for the national ambient air quality
standard for ozone—i.e., the air in this region violated the standards
set by EPA based on health impacts from ozone.  The individual
plaintiffs alleged that they were concerned about the health impacts
of recreating in areas with excess ozone, and submitted expert testi-
mony establishing that their health concerns were reasonable.100
Nevertheless, the court rejected the individual claims of standing:
[W]e believe the Individual Plaintiffs fall short of establishing that
their alleged injuries are sufficiently concrete to satisfy the first
prong of the standing test.  The Individual Plaintiffs offer no evi-
dence regarding the magnitude of the diminished air quality nor the
specific direct effect, if any, that this diminished air quality will
have on their health, environmental and recreational interests.
From the fact that the air quality in the geographical area sur-
rounding the landfill would have been better had Defendant ob-
tained a Part D permit, Individual Plaintiffs summarily conclude
that their health, environmental and recreational interests suffer
injury, without filling in the blanks.101
The Court went on, however, to find that the corporate landfill owner
had standing to assert the Clean Air Claims, holding that the competi-
tive economic injury that would result from the opening of a new
landfill easily satisfied the injury in fact standard of Article III stand-
ing.102
As the law of environmental standing has thus developed, indi-
viduals and not-for-profits who band together to assert environmental
99. 911 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
100. See id. at 870.
101. Id. at 869-70.
102. See id. at 871.
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causes tend to fall short of establishing sufficient “injury” even with
expert testimony concerning health impacts of environmental pollu-
tion, while business corporations may establish injury with mere alle-
gations of potentially lost profits.  This stark dichotomy between the
treatment of not-for-profit corporations asserting environmental in-
terests and business corporations asserting financial interests may
seem natural to late twentieth-century sensibility.  The pursuit of fi-
nancial profit seems to us the natural function of the corporate form;
profit is about money; money is the ultimate property; and litigation
about property rights seems to be now (and therefore must always
have been) the quintessential “case or controversy” for judicial reso-
lution.
In this view, pursuit of money is natural for a corporation while
pursuit of community values, such as environmental integrity, is un-
natural.  As one court put it, in rejecting a business corporation’s
claim of standing to object to pollution of the groundwater underlying
its mall on aesthetic grounds:
Though a corporation is a person for some purposes, we would be
most reluctant to hold that it has senses and so can be affronted by
deteriorations in its environment.  That is beyond the reach of legal
fiction and belongs in the realm of poetic license.103
As it turns out, however, this late twentieth century sensibility is his-
torically inaccurate, and might have been somewhat surprising to the
drafters of the “case or controversy” clause of Article III of the Con-
stitution.
III.  THE CORPORATE VEHICLE ON THE ROAD, HISTORICALLY
Can a corporation have a direct interest in the environmental in-
tegrity of a natural resource akin to a natural person’s aesthetic inter-
ests?  The District of Columbia Circuit, in Friendship Heights, em-
phatically said no.  However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
acknowledged that corporate “persons” have rights and interests that
go beyond their financial and material interests.  Thus, in First Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,104 the Supreme Court recognized the
right of business corporations to freedom of speech, specifically in-
cluding speech on political matters not affecting their financial inter-
103. Citizens Coordinating Comm. on Friendship Heights, Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 765 F.2d 1169, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing MACLEISH, COLLECTED POEMS
1917-1952 22 (1952)).
104. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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ests.105  If a corporation has a right to have political opinions apart
from its financial interests, and to enforce this right in federal court,
why may it not also have an interest in environmental well-being cog-
nizable by the same federal courts?
In fact, the business corporation, founded and organized around
financial profit, is a relatively recent development in the history of the
corporate “person.”  Early corporations, up to and including the time
of the framing of the Constitution, were much more likely to have
been chartered for religious or quasi-governmental purposes, such as
education or public works development, than for profit.  Business
corporations, chartered for profit-making purposes, did not become
commonplace until the nineteenth century.  While some early corpo-
rations organized for public works endeavors were incidentally quite
profitable to their members, the concept of a corporation organized
primarily to make money would have been just as alien to the framers
as one organized primarily to assert environmental values.
A. Of Corporations Ecclesiastical and Civil, Aggregate and Sole
At the time of the framing of the Constitution and its “case or
controversy” requirement, the corporate entity was a very different
creature than currently perceived.  A contemporaneous treatise of the
British law of corporations authored by Stewart Kyd106 describes and
classifies the typical corporations of the times in terms that do not in-
clude either the modern day business corporation, nor for that matter,
the modern day public interest organization.
Kyd describes the development of the corporate form as “collec-
tive bodies of men” that formed as an outgrowth of existing commu-
nities: “At the first introduction, they were little more than an im-
provement on the communities which had grown up imperceptibly,
without any positive institution . . . .”107  Kyd provides an essential
definition of the corporate form:
A corporation then, or a body politic, or body incorporate, is a col-
lection of many individuals, united into a body, under a special de-
nomination, having a perpetual succession under an artificial form,
and vested, by policy of the law, with the capacity of acting, in sev-
eral respects, as an individual, particularly of taking and granting
property, of contracting obligations, and of suing and being sued, of
105. See id. at 795 (invalidating a Massachusetts statute that prohibited corporations from
spending money to influence ballot referendum issues other than those that affected the corpo-
ration’s business interests).
106. STEWART KYD, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS (photo. reprint 1978) (1793).
107. See id. at 2.
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enjoying privileges and immunities in common, and of exercising a
variety of political rights, more or less extensive, according to the
design of its institution, or the powers conferred upon it, either at
the time of its creation, or at any subsequent period of its exis-
tence.108
The corporate form was thus defined by the attributes of perpetual
succession combined with the powers to take and grant property, con-
tract, and to sue and be sued, as well as to exercise those political
rights defined in its charter.
The 1793 treatise also describes various classes and distinctions
of then contemporary corporations.  It classifies corporations into
“corporations sole” and “corporations aggregate.”  Corporations sole
were those that provided perpetual succession to an office held by
one single individual; these corporations sole included “the King,
archbishops, certain deans, and prenedaries, all archdeacons, parsons,
and vicars . . . .”109  Corporations aggregate were those more currently
familiar entities that consisted of a group of individuals banded to-
gether for a common purpose.  Kyd further classifies corporations as
either ecclesiastical or lay; ecclesiastical corporations being “those of
which not only are the members spiritual persons, but of which the
object of the institution is also spiritual . . . .”110
All other corporations are lay corporations, which, according to
Kyd, are “again subdivided into two class, eleemosynary and civil.”111
Eleemosynary corporations were those “constituted for the perpetual
distribution of the free alms, or the bounty of the founder of them, to
such purposes as he has directed.”112  The chief examples Kyd pro-
vides of such eleemosynary corporations are hospitals for the poor
and educational institutions.  The treatise then describes by example
the various purposes of the civil (non-eleemosynary) lay corporation:
Civil corporations are established for a variety of temporal pur-
poses.  Thus a corporate capacity is given to the King, to prevent, in
general, the possibility of an interregnum or vacancy of the throne,
and to preserve entire the possessions of the crown; for immedi-
ately on the demise of one King, his successor is in full possession
of the regal rights and dignity[].  Other civil corporations are estab-
lished for the purpose of local government, such as the corporations
of cities and towns, under the names of Mayor and Commonalty,
Bailiffs and Burgesses, and other familiar denominations; and to
108. Id. at 13 (italics in original).
109. See id. at 20.
110. See id. at 22.
111. See id. at 25 (italics in original).
112. See id.
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this class seem properly to belong the general corporate bodies of
the two universities . . . . Other corporations are established for the
maintenance and regulation of some particular object of public
policy; such as the Corporation of the Trinity House for regulating
navigation[], the Bank, and the different Insurance Companies in
London; others for the regulation of trade, manufactures, and
commerce, such as the East India Company, and the companies of
trades in London and other towns; others for the improvement of
s[]cience in general, or some particular branches if it . . . ; the Soci-
ety of Antiquarians for promoting the study of antiquities; and the
Royal Academy of Arts for cultivating painting and s[]culpture.113
Starkly absent from this bestiary of 18th century corporate crea-
tures is any animal resembling either the modern day business corpo-
ration or the modern day environmental organization.  Certainly, the
business corporation had its ancestors in such entities as the
“Bank, . . . Insurance Companies . . .[, and] the East India Com-
pany.”114  But the primary purpose of these entities, at least according
to the leading contemporary treatise writer, was the accomplishment
of some particular public policy or regulation of commerce, not profit
for its own sake.  Presumably these entities had some corporate inter-
est in the public policy or regulation in question, independent of its
attachment to some property interest.  Similarly, there is no close
relative of the modern day environmental advocacy organization on
this list.  Such organizations do not distribute alms or bounty to the
poor (and thus do not fall within the class of eleemosynary institu-
tions); they would seem to be more closely descended from a variety
of other “civil” corporations, including both the municipal, and “sci-
entific” ones.115  And, finally, contrary to the suggestion of the latter-
day Friendship Heights court, assertion of aesthetic interests is not
necessarily in the realm of “poetic license.” 116  Ecclesiastical corpora-
tions in existence at the time of the Constitution’s framing were rou-
tinely organized for equally abstract “spiritual” purposes.117
It appears, then, that both the modern day business corporation
and the modern day environmental advocacy organizations de-
113. Id. at 28-29.
114. Id.
115. See James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Law and an Agenda for Reform,
34 EMORY L.J. 617, 631 (1985) (describing the origins of the American charitable corporation,
and noting that the colonial charitable corporation derived from the same corporate family as
religious and business corporations).
116. See Citizens Coordinating Comm. on Friendship Heights, Inc. v. Washington Metro.
Area Transit Auth., 765 F.2d 1169, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
117. See Fishman, supra note 116, at 631.
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scended from the same branch of the corporate family.  A scholarly
study of the development of business corporations and not-for-profit
corporations bear this family history out.
B. The Recent Development of the Business Corporation as an
Offshoot of Public Works Corporations
A 1982 monograph by Professor Ronald Seavoy studies the de-
velopment of the American business corporation, focusing on the ex-
perience in New York State from 1784 to 1855.118  Business corpora-
tions and benevolent corporations developed concurrently, and
neither had strong antecedents during colonial times.  Seavoy de-
scribes American corporation law as being wholly “indigenous,” that
is, drawing very little from British corporation law and developing
wholly independently from British law.119  Key to the rapid rise in the
American business corporation was the enactment of general corpo-
ration statutes, which were first provided for benevolent corporations,
and later expanded to include business corporations as well.
Seavoy describes five phases of the development of corporation
law in New York.120  In the first phase, individual charters were
granted.  The second phase was the enactment of general incorpora-
tion laws providing for the automatic incorporation of benevolent or-
ganizations (initially churches).  The third phase consisted of general
regulatory statutes setting forth the powers and restrictions on incor-
poration for specified classes of business corporations involved in im-
plementing public improvements, such as turnpike corporations.
These general statutes still required individual legislative action to in-
corporate each business.  The fourth phase consisted of general in-
corporation statutes allowing for incorporation of specific businesses
without individual legislative charter (but still restricted to the speci-
fied classes of businesses).  The fifth and final phase consisted of the
enactment of general incorporation statutes for any legitimate busi-
ness without legislative intervention.
Throughout this development of corporation law no great dis-
tinction was drawn between benevolent corporations and the nascent
public improvement businesses.  According to Professor Seavoy,
A turnpike and church building were both visible and useful public
improvements and all communities needed them.  A turnpike was a
business corporation that was undertaken for private profit, but be-
118. See SEAVOY, supra note 7.
119. See id. at 46.
120. See id. at 5-7.
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cause, in the eyes of the community, it performed a vital public
service (as important as religious instruction), the state legislatures
during the early national period gave equal encouragement to both
forms of corporations as a matter of public policy; one by general
incorporation statute and the other by a general regulatory statute
coupled with the pro forma passage of all charters.121
Instead of distinguishing between benevolent corporations and busi-
ness corporations, early American law drew a distinction between
municipal corporations, which held public office consonant with their
corporate title, and “private corporations,” which included those that
were constructing public improvements for profit as well as those that
were providing public benefits without profit.
This development of American corporation law, which took
place during the early national period, after the framing of the Consti-
tution, was of domestic origin.  As Professor Seavoy notes, the
American nation had little need for many of the corporate institutions
described by British commentators, such as the royal “corporation
sole.”122  Meanwhile, the development of institutionalized business
corporations led the development of similar institutions in Britain by
decades.123  In sum, the United States did not inherit a common law of
corporate powers and identity, but rather invented it to deal with the
exigencies of a rapidly developing nation.
C. The Grant of Sovereign Powers to Early Business Corporations
Early American benevolent and business organizations had sev-
eral reasons to seek the corporate form.  Chief among these were the
traditional desire to own land in a form that provided for institutional
succession (rather than succession through the individual trustees of
the institution), and the ability to receive bequests.124
Public improvement corporations, however, had an additional
reason to seek the corporate charter: very often their business pur-
pose required them to assume certain powers of the State.125  Con-
struction of improvements such as turnpikes, railroads, and canals
were impossible without the power of eminent domain; accordingly,
corporate charters for these kinds of early corporate businesses al-
lowed these corporations to assume the State’s sovereign power of
121. Id. at 6.
122. See id. at 46.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 10.
125. See id. at 5.
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eminent domain.  This is not to say that the grant of this sovereign
power to incorporate franchisees was non-controversial; indeed, the
gravity of the delegation of the State’s eminent domain power was
one of the chief arguments used against the creation of general incor-
poration statutes for turnpike companies and railroads during New
York’s constitutional convention of 1846.126  Nevertheless, general
corporation statutes providing the grant of eminent domain were
permitted.
The Supreme Court has long recognized the legitimacy of dele-
gations of the eminent domain power to private business corporations
providing facilities, such as railroads, for the public benefit.127  This
delegation of eminent domain authority to private corporations has
been described as “routine.”128  Indeed, there does not seem to have
been any serious question about the power of the state and federal
governments to delegate the eminent domain power to private busi-
ness corporations.  Yet, this power of eminent domain is usually de-
scribed as being the very essence of sovereignty; a power so wound up
with the very nature of government that it needs no constitutional
grant to be exercised.129
D.  The American Corporation, Article III, and Sovereign Interests
As the evolution of the American corporate animal shows, there
is nothing inherently “natural” about corporations being organized
for business pursuits, nor is there anything inherently “unnatural”
about corporations organized for spiritual (religious) or public inter-
est purposes.  Nor did the early national period draw any great dis-
tinction between these sorts of corporate enterprises.  The corporate
form has proven flexible, and evolved greatly in the ensuing devel-
opment of our nation, chiefly to accommodate and encourage the
formation and operation of business corporations.  The framers
drafted the Article III “case or controversy” requirement long before
the corporation’s metamorphosis into primarily a business organiza-
tion.  Because the implicit requirement of standing was placed in the
constitution long before corporate interests became identified with
business interests, there should be no reason to assume that only
business interests can be asserted as a corporate “injury in fact.”
126. See id. at 187.
127. See, e.g., Olcott v. Fond du Lac County, 83 U.S. 678, 691 (1872).
128. See Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 1999).
129. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Kohl v. United
States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875); United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985).
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Even more tantalizing to the question of standing for environ-
mental corporations is the routine grant of sovereign state powers—
usually the power of eminent domain—to franchise corporations.  If
the State can make a non-exclusive grant of this essential attribute of
sovereignty to a corporation, there is no principled reason that a State
could not also grant other sovereign interests, such as the State’s sov-
ereign interest in the purity of its air and waters, to an entity it has in-
corporated.  If a corporate entity has standing to assert eminent do-
main rights in court, why shouldn’t a corporation with explicit
authority have standing to assert the State’s sovereign environmental
interests in court?  The usefulness of such a delegation may depend,
of course, on the extent to which the State itself has judicially cogni-
zable interests in environmental resources that go beyond those of its
individual citizens.
IV.  THE STANDING OF STATES AND MUNICIPALITIES TO ASSERT
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION INTERESTS
Individuals have been required to show personal use of a re-
source and injury to that use in order to establish standing.  In con-
trast, the Supreme Court has long recognized the interest of States, as
sovereigns, in protecting the purity of the air, water, and other envi-
ronmental resources within its borders.  This interest has been recog-
nized wholly apart from a State’s interest as property owner or as a
representative for the interests of its citizens who use these resources.
Indeed, in delimiting the scope of a State’s capacity to sue as parens
patriae, 130 the Court has explicitly rejected the organizational standing
model of a state acting as representative of the individual interests of
its citizens.  Although less clear, there is also authority that munici-
palities enjoy a similar sovereign interest in the protection of the en-
vironment within their borders, independent of the interests of their
residents.
A. The State’s Sovereign Interest in Clean Air and Clean Water Within
it Borders
Writing for the Supreme Court in 1907 in the case of Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co.,131 Justice Holmes declared in sweeping terms
the sovereign interest of a State in protecting its environment:
130. The parens patriae doctrine, which literally means “parent of the country,” allows a
State or other sovereign to assert the interests of its citizens.  See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982).
131. 206 U.S. 230 (1907)
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[The] State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of
its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.  It has the last
word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests
and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.  It might have to pay indi-
viduals before it could utter that word, but with it remains the final
power. . . .132
In Tennessee Copper, the Court recognized Georgia’s right to sue a
plant located in Tennessee to abate an air pollution nuisance, under
the parens patriae doctrine.  The Court explicitly recognized the
quasi-sovereign right of a state to protect its natural resources on be-
half of its citizens, even apart from any direct proprietary interest of
the State in those resources.  In other cases, the Supreme Court had
similarly recognized the right of States, as sovereigns, to abate envi-
ronmental hazards emanating from beyond their borders, under nui-
sance law.133
These cases cannot be explained simply as a form of representa-
tional standing at the state level.134  Though the early cases pre-date
modern standing doctrine, a contemporary Supreme Court decision
makes clear that, far from being an analog to representational stand-
ing, a State’s parens patriae standing is its inverse.  Unlike representa-
tional standing, which depends on the identification of an individual
with interests that would merit individual standing, the Court has held
that parens patriae standing depends on the assertion of quasi-
sovereign interests that are not individuated.135
In Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, the
Supreme Court upheld the Article III standing of the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, acting in its parens patriae capacity, to challenge the
practices of apple growers giving preference to foreign pickers from
Jamaica over workers from Puerto Rico, which it alleged to be in
violation of the Wagner-Peyser Act136 and the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952.137  Far from basing this standing on the State’s
representation of the individual interests of its citizens, the Supreme
Court emphasized the need for a State asserting parens patriae
standing to identify “quasi-sovereign” interests that exist apart from
132. Id. at 237.
133. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259
U.S. 419 (1922); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46
(1907); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
134. Cf. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (holding that
a state-commissioned agency may assert organizational standing on behalf of its constituents).
135. See Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982).
136. 29 U.S.C. § 49 et seq. (1994).
137. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1994).
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any individual interests of its citizens.  Referring to parens patriae
standing, the Court opined:
That concept does not involve the State’s stepping in to represent
the interests of particular citizens who, for whatever reason, cannot
represent themselves.  In fact, if nothing more than this is in-
volved—i.e., if the State is only a nominal party without a real in-
terest of its own—then it will not have standing under the parens
patriae doctrine . . . . Rather, to have such standing the State must
assert an injury to what has been characterized as a “quasi-
sovereign” interest, which is a judicial construct that does not lend
itself to a simple or exact definition.138
In explaining these “quasi-sovereign” interests, distinct from the
interest of particular citizens, that would suffice for parens patriae
standing, the Court provided several examples.  These examples in-
cluded the sovereign interest of a state in adopting and enforcing
codes and regulations to apply to persons within its jurisdiction, and
the right to demand recognition by other sovereigns.  The Court em-
phasized that these interests are not the interest of the State as an
owner or proprietor, or of the State as representative of a particular
individual interest:
Interests of private parties are obviously not in themselves sover-
eign interests, and they do not become such simply by virtue of the
State’s aiding in their achievement.  In such situations, the State is
no more than a nominal party.  Quasi-sovereign interests stand
apart from all three of the above: They are not sovereign interests,
proprietary interests, or private interests pursued by the State as a
nominal party.  They consist of a set of interests that the State has
in the well-being of its populace.139
This description of the essence of Article III parens patriae
standing is the exact inverse of the Article III requirements articu-
lated by the Court for individual (and representational) standing.
The individual must show “concrete and particularized” harm.140
Such “particularized” harm is an anathema to parens patriae standing,
which cannot be based on the interest of a “particular” citizen.  Con-
versely, the individual seeking standing cannot rely on “generally
available grievance[s],”141 while parens patriae standing is specifically
based on the generalized interest of the State “in the well being of its
populace.”142
138. Barez, 458 U.S. at 600-01 (citation ommitted).
139. Id. at 602.
140. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
141. See id. at 573-74.
142. See Barez, 458 U.S. at 602.
I - DIRECT ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING FOR CHARTERED CONSERVATION CORPORATIONS - COPLAN.DOC04/25/01  9:31 AM
Fall 2001] DIRECT ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING 213
Significantly, the Barez Court relied on the series of interstate
nuisance cases discussed above to flesh out its concept of exactly what
sorts of State interests qualified as “quasi-sovereign” interests ame-
nable to judicial recognition under the parens patriae doctrine.  Not-
ing that these nuisance cases were “instances in which the injury to
the public health and comfort was graphic and direct,”143 the Court
also noted that “parens patriae interests extend well beyond the pre-
vention of such traditional public nuisances.”144  These early nuisance
decisions, combined with the Court’s explicit reference to a State’s in-
terest in the purity of its environmental resources in Barez suggest
that States have an Article III parens patriae interest in preserving
environmental resources that goes well beyond the interests required
to establish individual standing.
Indeed, the Court itself seems to assume the existence of auto-
matic State standing, as a sovereign, to enforce environmental re-
quirements with respect to resources located within its borders.  In a
case where the State of California challenged the failure of the De-
partment of the Interior to issue a consistency determination under
the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA),145 the Court found Cali-
fornia’s standing “clear” without any inquiry into “injury in fact” re-
quirements:
Petitioner-defendants (hereafter petitioners) state their disagree-
ment with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s holding that
environmental groups and local governments have standing to sue
under CZMA § 307(c)(1), but do not challenge that standing deci-
sion here.  Since the State of California clearly does have standing,
we need not address the standing of the other respondents, whose
position here is identical to the State’s.146
A State’s sovereign interest in the integrity of its environment is
thus a constitutionally cognizable interest that exists independent of
143. See id. at 604.
144. See id. at 605.
145. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1994).
146. Secretary of Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 319 (1984).  States have similarly been
held to be “persons” who are entitled to sue as plaintiffs under various federal citizen-suit provi-
sions.  See Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167
(1976); Massachusetts v. United States Veterans Admin., 541 F.2d 119 (1st Cir. 1976); United
States v. City of Toledo, 867 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ohio 1994); Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp.,
619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 453 U.S. 917 (1981), on
remand, 680 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1982).  But see United States v. City of Hopewell, 508 F. Supp.
526 (E.D. Va. 1980).
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the sort of individualized “injury in fact” requirement applied in indi-
vidual standing analysis.147
B. Municipal Standing to Assert Environmental Interests
Several courts have similarly recognized municipal standing to
assert environmental interests without inquiry into individualized
“injury in fact.”  One early Second Circuit case under NEPA found
such standing without question.  In a case in which a municipality
challenged the United States Postal Service’s failure to complete an
environmental impact statement for a new postal facility that would
result in the closing of an existing postal facility in downtown Roches-
ter, New York, the Court emphatically upheld the standing of the
City of Rochester to press its NEPA claims:
The conclusion of the district court that neither the City of Roches-
ter nor the regional planning board has standing to seek enforce-
ment of NEPA and the ICA is out of harmony with settled law.
Well-reasoned cases have uniformly held that a municipality has
standing to challenge federal agency action resulting in environ-
mental damage within the city.148
This holding suggests that a municipality has standing per se to
challenge “environmental damage” within its borders.  Recent cases,
however, have applied more traditional “injury in fact” analysis to
address the standing of municipalities.  Thus, one series of cases has
relied heavily on property ownership by municipalities in assessing
their environmental standing.149  Another case seemed to recognize
sufficient potential injury in the expenses a village would incur to re-
spond to flooding that might result from a proposed project.150
These municipal standing cases may be significant to the ques-
tion of corporate environmental standing, as municipalities are often
explicitly organized as state-chartered corporate entities, and even
147. Despite the relative clarity of these Supreme Court precedents, some courts do con-
tinue to apply Article III “injury in fact” analysis to State assertions of environmental claims in
the federal courts.  See, e.g., Idaho v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 35 F.3d 585 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (finding standing based on State ownership of lands that might be impacted by pollution);
Nevada v. Burford, 918 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting Nevada’s standing to assert claims
under the National Environmental Policy Act with respect to studies for siting of nuclear waste
repository within the State).
148. City of Rochester v. United States Postal Serv., 541 F.2d 967, 972 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing
City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972); Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344,
348 (D. Conn. 1972)).
149. See Churchill County v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1998); Catron County Bd. of
Comm’rs v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429 (10th Cir. 1996); Douglas
County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995).
150. See Village of Elk Grove Village v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1993).
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when not so chartered, are usually recognized to enjoy the essential
attributes of “corporateness.”151  These more recent cases considering
municipal standing have ignored whatever sovereign environmental
interests municipalities may enjoy as subdivisions of the state, and
have instead focussed on the municipalities’ direct, “corporate” prop-
erty or monetary interests.  These cases may simply reflect the trend
toward closer judicial scrutiny of environmental standing where non-
business interests are at stake.
Municipalities are not generally considered sovereigns, how-
ever.152  Their interests and powers, like those of private corporations,
are limited to those granted by the state.153  Municipal charters do not
typically include an explicit grant of the State’s sovereign interest in
protecting the air, lands, and waters within its boundaries.  In the ab-
sence of such a grant, there is no more reason to expect courts to rec-
ognize such interests on the part of a municipal corporation, than for
a private environmental corporation.  This does not mean, however,
that an explicit grant of the State’s sovereign interest in protecting its
environment to a state-chartered corporation would not be recog-
nized for standing purposes.
V.  BACK TO THE DIRECT ROUTE: EXPLICIT DELEGATION
OF SOVEREIGN ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS TO
CONSERVATION CORPORATIONS
States have long been laboratories for innovations in the law of
environmental protection.  The State of Michigan adopted citizen en-
vironmental enforcement legislation before the federal government
did.154 This state legislation in turn inspired the federal citizen-suit
provisions.155  The recent contraction of federal standing doctrine and
the restrictions placed on federal representational standing may pres-
ent a similar opportunity for state legislative initiative.
As described by Professor Seavoy, the corporate form has
proven highly flexible throughout United States history.  The corpo-
rate vehicle evolved to meet the exigencies of an expanding, industri-
151. See SEAVOY, supra note 7, at 21-23; see also Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the
Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in Legal Change, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 369 (1985).
152. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (finding that municipal corporations are not
state sovereigns for the purposes of 11th amendment immunity).  See also Mount Healthy City
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
153. See id. at 530.
154. Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 691.1201-
691.1207, repealed by 1994 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 451 (Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.1701 (2000)).
155. See AXLINE, supra note 49, at § 1.02(A) at 1-5.
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alizing nation, resulting in the genesis and evolution of the business
corporation.  The corporate form similarly evolved and was adapted
to the needs of religious institutions and municipalities.  Courts read-
ily accepted this evolution, and did not flinch at the delegation to cor-
porate entities of quintessentially sovereign powers such as the emi-
nent domain power.  This nation has evolved into a post-industrial
society in which the exigencies of protecting and conserving environ-
mental resources have replaced the exigencies of opening these re-
sources up to exploitation.  The time may be ripe for the corporate
vehicle to evolve again, this time into an entity in which the State’s
environmental interests are similarly delegated.
What I propose is the creation of a new class of state-chartered
not-for-profit corporations.  Such a corporation, which might be
dubbed a “chartered conservation corporation,” would be similar to
existing not-for-profits, with the exception that the governing statute
would make an explicit grant of the State’s sovereign interest in the
integrity of its environmental resources.  Such a grant might provide:
In addition to the other powers and authorities granted under this
Chapter, a Chartered Conservation Corporation shall have the
non-exclusive right to assert before any court of competent jurisdic-
tion the State’s sovereign interests in the protection of its environ-
mental resources, including the air, lands, forests, flora, fauna, and
waters located within the jurisdiction of the State.  This authority
shall be limited to the enforcement of claims for injunctive relief
and penalties payable to the treasury of the State or the United
States under any common law claim or statute providing for a pri-
vate right of action, but shall not extend to permit the collection of
compensation due to the State for environmental damage.
This grant should be available only to those not-for-profit corpo-
rations chartered explicitly for the protection of particular environ-
mental resources within the State.156  In order to ensure that chartered
conservation corporations are truly representative, the availability of
this status might be limited to those corporations organized as mem-
156. In the 1990’s, citizens’ environmental enforcement litigation has largely devolved from
actions instituted by national environmental organizations to claims more local and regional
environmental organizations focused on a particular regional environmental resource such as a
river, watershed, sound, lake, or bay.  Compare MILLER, supra note 49, at 10-12 (describing
Clean Water Act enforcement efforts by Natural Resources Defense Council), with Robert F.
Kennedy, Jr. & Steven P. Solow, Environmental Litigation as Clinical Education: A Case Study,
8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 319, 324 (1993) (discussing Hudson Riverkeeper organization), and
Cronin v. Browner, 898 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (including plaintiffs Delaware
Riverkeeper, San Francisco Baykeeper, Puget Soundkeeper, Long Island Soundkeeper, and the
Baykeeper for the New York and New Jersey Harbor Estuary).
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bership organizations.  Opportunities for abuse should be limited, as
the restriction against collecting damages otherwise due to the state,
and the non-exclusive nature of the grant, should limit the opportuni-
ties for extortionate suits or collusive settlements.
This grant of the state’s environmental interests is certainly less
dramatic than the delegation of the sovereign power of eminent do-
main, which is routinely accepted by courts.  The eminent domain
power, after all, carries with it the power to take private property in
the name of the state, and to evict persons from their homes if neces-
sary.  No similar consequences flow from the proposed grant of state
environmental protection interests.  Similarly, granting a state char-
tered corporation a direct interest in protecting the integrity of envi-
ronmental resources is no more abstract than chartering religious
corporations to advance religious interests.
Nor should such an explicit delegation of the sovereign interest
in environmental resources run afoul of the Morton Court’s rejection
of organizational standing to represent environmental concerns gen-
erally.  What the Morton and Lujan Courts emphatically rejected was
the pursuit of environmental causes divorced from any connection to
the tangible environmental resources affected.  As the Court’s most
recent decision in Laidlaw makes clear, a legitimate interest in the af-
fected environmental resource should suffice.  One way to establish
that interest is by showing regular use of the affected resource by
members of the organization.  The Court has also recognized in the
past, however, that the State as sovereign has a direct and tangible in-
terest in all of the environmental resources located within its borders.
There is no reason that a State-delegated sovereign interest in the re-
source itself should not suffice.  After all, if the State has a constitu-
tionally cognizable interest in the “purity” of its air, lands, and waters,
there is no reason that the State may not share this interest with a
corporate entity it has chartered, particularly one that is organized
specifically to protect a particular environmental resource that is at
issue in the litigation.
If adopted, the chartered conservation corporation should put to
rest most of the organizational and representational standing issues
that currently plague citizens environmental enforcement litigation.
The focus of such litigation could return to determining whether the
defendant has violated the pertinent statutes rather than complex and
intrusive inquiries into organizational structure, personal recreational
habits of plaintiffs’ members, and expert testimony about observable
environmental harm or reasonable concern.
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CONCLUSION
Although business corporations have fared far better in recent
years in establishing standing to litigate under the federal environ-
mental statutes, there is nothing about the inherent nature of the cor-
porate form or its history that would lend itself to the advancement of
business interests rather than environmental resource interests.  The
business corporation has evolved since the founding of this nation
(and since the drafting of the case or controversy clause of the Consti-
tution).  The not-for-profit corporation might similarly evolve to as-
sert the resource protection interests of the State.  An explicit grant
of the State’s sovereign interest in environmental resource protection
should be recognized by federal courts to give such corporations
standing to enforce environmental protections without regard to the
individual interests of its members.
